THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE OBAMA-XI SUMMIT:
TALK IS CHEAP

Nguyen Manh Hung*

ONE SUMMIT, DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 

The first visit of Xi Jinping as Chinese president to the United States in September 2015 stoked the attention and anticipation of China watchers in many countries. Their assessments of the visit tend to reflect the prevalent mood in each country. At one end, Chinese media regarded the trip as highly successful, one that highlighted China’s role as a great, rising power and President Xi as a world’s statesman. At the other end, Japanese media and commentators focused on the “deep root” of the U.S.-China confrontation over maritime security, the failure of the summit to change China’s “unwillingness to stop its provocative actions” in its neighboring waters, the impossibility for China to build a “new type of great power relations” with the United States; and pointed to the need for “further security cooperation” between Washington and Tokyo to deter “Beijing’s revisionism.” Somewhere in between were Indian analysts who, no doubt influenced by their country’s tradition of neutrality and preference for non-violence, hailed the success of “the first arm control agreement of the cyber era, ” but  warned that the two superpowers had entered “an area of tensions,” and counseled the U.S. to find “the right balance between accepting that the era of U.S.-dominated world order is coming to an end while promoting a new global institutional framework” that reflects the “interests of both Western and rising powers.” For the United States, disappointment more than optimism reflects the general feeling among American policy makers and analysts.

PRE-SUMMIT POSTURING

Months before President Xi’s visit, Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, particularly the speed and magnitude of its land reclamation turning submerged reefs into artificial islands with potential military use has prompted grave concerns and unfavorable reactions not only from other Asian claimants but also from the United States.  Many military analysts saw this as a “game changer” dramatically altering the balance of power in the South China Sea; powerful voices in the United States have clamored for a strong response.

On the eve of Xi’s meeting with Obama, two major U.S. newspapers, The Washington Post   and The Wall Street Journal published editorials describing China’s behavior in the South China Sea as “aggression” and “aggressive,” suggesting “It’s time to get tough on China and President Xi,” and calling for a “more forceful American response.”

From Congress, Senator McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, lamented inaction as a “dangerous mistake that grants de facto recognition of China’s man-made sovereignty claims,” and urged the United States to “send ships to within the 12-mile limit to make it clear that the U.S. does not recognized China’s claim.” McCain position was supported by Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, not only in terms of naval exercises but also maritime flights over those islands.

From the administration, both National Security Adviser Susan Rice and Defense Secretary Ashton Carter emphatically affirmed that “the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all around the world.”

Under these circumstances, it was expected that the summit would address this issue and, hopefully, some sign of flexibility from China would come out of the meeting.

DISAPPOINTING RESULT

In anticipation of the Xi-Obama meeting, U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes told a reporter from the Chinese Central Television Network on September 22, that climate and energy cooperation, cyber security and the South China Sea would be discussed. But when a White House press release was distributed after the summit listing areas where the two leaders “agree to work together to constructively manage our differences and decide to expand and deepen cooperation,” it failed to mention the South China Sea. Apparently, they reached no agreement on this issue. U.S. threat of sanctions led to an agreement to stop cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, but verbal protests about the South China Sea brought no such results.

CHINA’S LONG TERM STRATEGY

This is no surprise to those who follow Chinese words and deeds. Over the years, China has persistently, opportunistically, and creepingly enforced its claim in the South China Sea to the point it no longer bothers to come up with serious, convincing arguments to justify its behavior.

Three months before President Xi’s visit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi simplistically declared at the Fourth World Peace Forum in Beijing that “One thousand years ago China was a large sea-faring nation. So of course China was the first country to discover, use and administer the Nansha [Spratly] Islands.” He followed this flimsy claim by saying firmly and emotionally, “China’s demands of sovereignty over the Nansha Islands have not expanded and neither will they shrink. Otherwise we would not be able to face our forefathers and ancestors.” Earlier, on April 9, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying had insisted that China had “undisputable sovereignty” over the Spratly Islands and “adjacent waters,” and that its construction was “fair, reasonable, and lawful.” To answer the concern about militarization, Hua resorted to double talk; she stated that China activities were mainly for civilian purposes, but also are intended to serve “necessary military defense requirements.” Four months later, on August 11, Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua openly admitted that “necessary defense facilities” would be constructed.

Below the top leaders, both sides have laid out their positions.

AGREE TO DISAGREE

At a joint news conference in the Rose Garden on September 25, President Obama reiterated directly to President Xi the “right of all countries to freedom of navigation and overflight” and repeated word-by-word the affirmation that “The United States will continue to sail, fly and operate anywhere that international law allows.” To this, President Xi said China was committed to respecting and upholding the “freedom of navigation and overflight that countries enjoy according to international law,” then repeated the same casual argument that islands in the South China Sea have been Chinese territory “since ancient times,” that “we have the right to uphold our territorial sovereignty and lawful legitimate maritime rights and interests,” but assured Obama that “relevant construction activity that China is undertaking in the Nansha [Spratly] Islands does not target or impact any country and there is no intention to militarize.” In other words, Xi was adamant about China’s long held position. It is important to note that freedom of navigation does not have the same meaning for China and the United States. And no militarization does not necessary mean China would not build “necessary defense facilities” on the man-made islands. After all, airstrips may have dual purpose, those building for “civilian” purpose can also be used or easily adapted for military or “defense” purpose.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES, DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

The problem is the discrepancy between China’s words and deeds. On August 5, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told reporters at the 26th ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur that China had stopped the land reclamation projects, but satellite images taken on September 20 by ISH Jane’s Defence Weekly showed that Chinese workers had been carrying out dredging work around the artificial islands for more than a month after that statement, and that they had completed a runway on Fiery Cross Reef to “accelerate construction on the new island and to start air patrols over the disputed islands.”

For the U.S. its words are not followed by actions. While the president and his top advisers said the United States had the right to fly, sail, and operate anywhere, those who were responsible for the implementation of the president’s wishes, Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear and Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Harry Harris, testified at a Senate hearing on September 17 that “U.S. ships have not sailed within the 12-mile boundary since 2012” and the U.S. also “has not conducted a direct fly-over of any of the lands and territories that China recently has claimed.” Most recently, on October 13,  approximately three weeks after the summit, U.S. Secretary Carter re-issued the “fly, sail, and operated” threat formula amidst rumor of imminent U.S. freedom of navigation operations within the 12-mile limit of Chinese newly built islands to challenge China’s claims. What happens next will send a clear signal as to whether or not the U.S. has the capability and determination to stop further Chinese encroachment.

So far, the fact is while China “talks and takes” the United States threatens and hedges. The U.S. has failed to prevent a major fait accompli which could further accelerate an arms race in the region, give China an overwhelming strategic advantage over other claimants in the South China Sea, and seriously threaten maritime security, making it increasingly difficult to enforce freedom of navigation in the South China Sea without the constant danger of an accidental or unintended armed conflict. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL STATES 

The Obama-Xi summit leaves the impression that the United States is helpless to stop China from creating “facts on the ground” that cannot be reversed. If this process continues, there is a danger that, in the words of Marvin Ott,  

“Absent effective countermeasures, the predictable future for the South China Sea will include China’s piecemeal seizure of additional territory and its further development of naval and air assets until it has de facto control of all the South China Sea within the ‘nine-dash line’ demarcated on Chinese maps. International maritime passage through the South China Sea will be subject to Chinese regulation and approval.”  

This prospect is not lost on leaders of small countries in Southeast Asia. In a talk at Singapore Press Club on August 27, 2015 after the Obama-Xi summit, Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam made clear that “China’s long term objective is to be the dominant power in East Asia,” and there can be no doubt that China’s build-up is “to achieve the capability to control sea lanes in the South China Sea” and to “exclude the U.S. from the region.” 

Only a united stand by ASEAN and strong U.S. resolve can have a chance to stop China’s excessive ambition and force a fair and enforceable solution to the South China Sea dispute. These two factors are mutually reinforcing: U.S. resolve encourages ASEAN solidarity and ASEAN solidarity firms up U.S. resolve. 

Xi’s adamant position puts the U.S. in a dilemma. If it challenges China by conducting ship passages within the 12-mile limit and overflights over Chinese man-made islands, it may provoke a Chinese strong reaction. If it does not, it gives tacit approval to Chinese creeping assertion of sovereignty and control over a large swath of water in the South China Sea, undermines its credibility, and weakens the trust of small countries in Asia in its role as a “stabilizing force” in the Asia-Pacific region.  

The success of China’s South China Sea strategy is a result of a combination of factors: Chinese cunning policy, American ambivalence, and ASEAN disunity. For years countries in Southeast Asia have relied on ASEAN solidarity and centrality, and strong American engagement to protect themselves against the encroachment of a powerful regional hegemon. Perception of American weakness and Chinese inevitable rise has important implications for small countries.  

While the U.S is consolidating its strategic position at the outer periphery of the first island chain, China is expanding its strategic position inside the first island chain. The failure of the U.S. to act impacted indirectly on the cohesiveness of ASEAN. Without the support of the collective weight of ASEAN and the backdrop of American engagement against Chinese infringement, small countries in the region tend to drift away from collective toward individual solution to their predicament. Bitter experience with the lack of ASEAN support during the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 has led the Philippines to intensify its efforts to revive and strengthen its military alliance with the U.S. Indonesia is drifting away from a defense strategy based on ASEAN leadership and centrality to a “post-ASEAN” policy based on promoting its role as a maritime power in an “Asian fulcrum of four.” Others seeing the inevitable dominance of China may decide to jump on the Chinese winning bandwagon before it is too late. 

Confrontation between the United States and China is undesirable and dangerous, but accommodation between a revisionist China and a status quo United States may lead to an amicable division of spheres of influence in Asia-Pacific, seriously limiting the choice of small countries. In the next few years, Foreign Minister Shanmugam warned, “because of their competition, they, as major powers are wont to do, will soon be talking to us in terms of ‘either you’re with us or against us.’” 

The challenge for ASEAN is to quickly re-establish its unity and centrality to be safe from being forced to choose between China and the United States in their competition for power and influence. Is there still time for ASEAN to regroup?

*Nguyen Manh Hung is Professor Emeritus of Government and International Affairs, George Mason University, United States and Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. Views in this article are the author’s own, they do not represent the institutions with which he is associated.

Received by Viet-Studies on October 23, 2015