BOOK REVIEW

China’s Rise and The Balance of Influence in Asia

Edited by William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski

University of Pittsburgh Press,

328 pages, $27.95

Reviewed by Jane Rickards

China: friend or foe? To find the answer to this critical question, the editors of this volume William W. Keller, the director of the Matthew B. Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies and Thomas G Rawski, a professor of economics and history, both of Pittsburgh University, along with 8 other contributors, analyze many aspects of China’s rise.

Using a multidisciplinary approach, they explore the nature of China’s rapid economic growth spurt over the past 25 years, along with accompanying political changes, military developments and its changing relationships with other Asian countries.

An animating concern for all the writers is apparent U.S. disengagement in Asia. Echoing the observations of many in this region, editors Messrs. Keller and Rawski note that American foreign policy has been overwhelmed by the twin issues of terrorism and the war in Iraq. Meanwhile, China is consolidating strong relationships with its neighbors and heading inch-by-inch towards superpower status. Worryingly, neither the Clinton nor the Bush administration have re-evaluated Asia policy in proportion to the size and scope of China’s rise. Instead American policy appears piecemeal and distracted. As Messrs. Rawski and Keller write, "Washington relies on a tired mix of recycled policies … a shifting series of compromises between cooperation and containment." China should be a top priority for the next administration in Washington.

Messrs. Rawski and Keller point out that China has transformed from near autarky in the 1970s to a global economy that exerts enormous influence over world markets. Its expanding trade and investment links with other Asian countries threaten to weaken U.S. influence. At the same time, China’s arsenal is growing. Since 1999, China’s military budget has exceeded those of major European powers and, since 2001, has even surpassed that of Japan, reaching $56 billion in 2003. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission announced in its 2005 and 2006 reports to congress that "trends in the U.S.-China relationship have negative implications for the long-term economic and security interests of the United States."

The question is then, is China biding its time? Is it waiting until its economy gains enough critical mass to allow it to exert political and military dominance as an enemy superpower of the U.S.? Is China’s policy of economic engagement and commercial diplomacy merely tactical, a "charm offensive"?

On the whole, the authors say most likely "no", with a strongly issued caveat that it is vital for the U.S. to remain engaged with the region. They also say, short of a war, the U.S. cannot stop China’s rise. Mr. Rawski and contributors Loren Brandt and Xiaodong Zhu in the second chapter entitled: "International Dimensions of China’s Long Boom" argue that economic growth—essential for maintaining the legitimacy of China’s present government—in this era of globalization depends on overseas markets beyond China’s military control. China’s military is unable to secure access to Brazil’s iron ore, Canada’s tar sands, Iran’s crude oil, Africa’s mineral wealth or the consumer markets of North America and Western Europe. This puts pressure on Beijing to emphasize compromise and diplomacy. Optimistically, they even argue that there could be overlaps between U.S. and Chinese interests, for example both powers could have a joint interest in working together to promote stability in the Middle East and other resource-rich countries.

Ellen L. Frost in a chapter entitled "China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat" argues that China is a skilled practitioner of commercial diplomacy with Asian countries, but, again, Washington has nothing to fear if it remains engaged in the region. Asian countries first discovered that China was interested in forging good relations when Beijing gave generous loans to several Southeast Asian nations during the currency crisis in 1997 and 1998. At the same time, she writes, the U.S. unwisely turned its back on Thailand when its currency collapsed and triggered the crisis, even though Washington had extended help to Mexico when the peso crashed in 1994.

China has since made numerous diplomatic and commercial overtures. Chinese plans for intra-Asian Free Trade Agreements are assuming a role tantamount to security alliances. However, Ms. Frost says, the Association of South-East Asian Nations along with Japan and South Korea do not want to turn away from strong ties with Washington and view its role as a balancer against China, but some have the impression that Washington is indifferent. Adam Segal, in another chapter, "Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security" also points out that the smaller states of Southeast Asia are not defecting from the U.S. to China but are instead working to mitigate China’s threat by meshing it in a web of commercial relations while simultaneously stepping up defense ties with Washington.

This volume deserves both praise and criticism. Approaching China’s rise from a multidisciplinary approach is sorely needed—particularly in the ways some contributors, such as Robert S. Ross, weigh up China’s commercial power against its military power. All too frequently, security and economics studies are treated as mutually exclusive disciplines. It’s not uncommon for economists based in Taiwan to voice immense frustration at the government there for failing to institute direct links and completely open up economically to the mainland, as if China’s 900-plus ballistic missiles pointed at Taiwan simply did not exist.

My criticism is that the authors oversimplify Asian governments and policies and do not award the same sophisticated perspective that is given to the U.S. government. Messrs. Rawski and Keller complain that three basic world-views are competing for ascendancy in Washington. One would have the U.S. as the world’s only hyperpower, which needs to shape the 21st century to its advantage and sees China as its only plausible competitor. (This view was prominent in the first administration of George W. Bush and is seen as underpinning the invasion and occupation of Iraq.) One envisions a coming second Cold War, but this time the rival superpower is China. And the third perspective—that the authors say they tend to support provided the U.S. remains engaged in Asia—emphasizes the mutual benefits of economic interdependence. That is, the U.S. government is not presented in this volume as a coherent and single actor, but a policy-making "black box" where competing ideas have caused some inconsistent policy outcomes that give a poor impression to some Asian countries.

However, Asian countries are not given the same treatment as the U.S. We are not given an inside view of their policy-making processes. This leads Robert S. Ross in his chapter "Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia" to conclude, to my surprise, that growing economic ties with the mainland are causing Taiwan to adjust its defense and foreign policies. As evidence he cites the opposition-dominated legislature’s six-year failure to pass a massive special budget for a purchase of diesel submarines, pac-3 antimissile systems and antisubmarine reconnaissance aircraft that were first offered to Taiwan by the Bush administration in 2001. He depicts this as a decision made by Taiwan as a whole.

But the U.S. is not the only country with competing factions that cause it to send the contradictory signals to the outside world. Most observers in Taiwan view the opposition legislators who block this budget as motivated by petty and partisan concerns. Accommodation to Chinese power and an impression that Taiwan possibly cannot match China in defense spending, as Mr. Ross argues, is a factor for some lawmakers. However, others simply wish to sabotage President Chen Shui-bian and his pro-independence government.

In the middle of this year, the opposition consented to move a tiny fraction of this budget and purchase some of this weaponry, a sign, analysts said, that Nationalist leader Ma Ying-jeou wanted to ditch the partisan image and improve relations with Washington ahead of presidential elections next year. And one of Mr. Ma’s close policy advisers has said that if he is elected, the Nationalists will approach the newly elected American administration with a fresh shopping list for weaponry. The Nationalists still view Washington as important.

In any case, they do not represent the dominant ideology in Taiwan. Instead the nation is divided. President Chen Shui-bian, who represents pro-independence voters, was elected president in 2000 and again in 2004 with a slim majority of the votes. Mr. Ross’s statement that Mr. Chen’s win was not a vote for independence and instead reflected sympathy votes after a botched assassination attempt does not make complete sense. Even if sympathy votes did allow Mr. Chen to win, and there’s no proof this was the case, who could possibly feel any sympathy for a politician they didn’t like, identify with or agree with? A win is a win.

And, despite Joseph Fewsmith’s fascinating chapter "The Politics of Liberalization: Are There Limits?" in which he describes how the Chinese government has reformed its Leninist roots to accommodate its economic rise and relations with Chinese society at large, a look inside China’s policy-making "black box" is still not offered. It would have been very helpful to understand the different factions in China’s governments and what key leaders with decision-making power really think of the West.

Ms. Rickards is a journalist based in Taipei.