Troubles for the ‘China Model’

Meritocracy has worked for Beijing, but to survive, the system needs more openness

 By Daniel A. Bell

President Xi Jinping concluded his recent visit to the U.S. with a flurry of announcements meant to show China’s determination to play a larger, more responsible global role. But even as he made new commitments on issues like climate change and development aid, most observers were focused on what he might do to put his own house in order.

Just a few years ago, China was widely seen as an almost unstoppable economic powerhouse, governed by able and committed leaders and well on its way to challenging the U.S. on the global stage. Today, the great worry is that China’s economy is imploding and will take the rest of the world down with it.

The China pessimists are right to be concerned, but their fears are overplayed. What I have called the “China model” is more resilient than we give it credit for. China’s success over the past several decades is not just a story of economic growth. Nor is it just a story of authoritarian government that uses ruthless means to secure social stability. It is also a story of political meritocracy, with leaders who are groomed over decades and expected to make tough choices for the long-term good.

That model isn’t dead, but it is in dire need of repair. Whether China’s rulers can achieve the necessary reforms will be the real measure of their leadership, for China and the world.

From Confucius onward, Chinese intellectuals argued over the best ways of selecting and promoting officials with superior qualities. For much of imperial Chinese history, leaders were selected by means of examination, and they advanced by performing well at lower levels of government. Following the disastrous years of dictatorship under Mao Zedong, this traditional system was re-established by Deng Xiaoping but with a modernizing twist: Officials were evaluated for their ability to promote economic growth.

This system is now firmly entrenched, not just because it is rooted in Chinese political culture but also because it has delivered the economic goods. It is hard to deny China’s achievements since Deng’s reforms: More than 400 million people have been lifted out of poverty.

Strong economic performance has become the primary measure of political legitimacy in China, which is why today’s economic problems have generated such shock waves. Clearly, the days of 10% annual economic growth are over. Nor is it clear that Chinese officials know how to manage the resulting financial turbulence. When the Shanghai stock market began to tumble in recent months, officials responded with administrative and punitive measures that were widely condemned as haphazard and ineffective.

The stock market bungle isn’t a make-or-break issue for the legitimacy of party rule because only a small percentage of Chinese invest. But if the economic downturn is prolonged, and if the Chinese people hold the government responsible and lose faith in its ability to correct the situation, then the China model is indeed under threat. It’s an unlikely scenario anytime soon.

The more serious threat to the Chinese political system is that economic growth will lose its status as the main source of legitimacy. Over the past several decades, government officials could be promoted based on economic performance above all else. Today, the country’s problems are much more diverse: rampant pollution, growing inequality, precarious social welfare, not to mention massive corruption.

Here things become more complicated for a political system that prides itself on the meritocratic selection and promotion of leaders. Should government officials be assessed according to their ability to deliver economic growth, to improve social welfare, to reduce corruption, to deal with the environment, to reduce the gap between rich and poor, or to achieve some combination of these goals?

It is impossible to resolve such issues in a noncontroversial way, and there are bound to be many winners and losers no matter what the decision. All this means that the government needs more input from the people, not just to help decide on priorities but also to take the heat off when large constituencies are unhappy with some policies.

The China model can be saved only if the government opens up the political system. People will need to argue about what works and to have a greater say. This will entail more freedoms of speech and association and mechanisms for consultation and deliberation within and outside the party. Electoral democracy, which now is allowed to operate only at the village level, needs to be extended to townships and institutionalized within the party.

All the innovations of modern democratic societies, such as open public hearings, deliberative polling and referendums on key issues, could help to stabilize the political system. And more firmly establishing the rule of law is necessary to protect individual rights.

Would such developments mean an inevitable march to one person, one vote at the highest levels of government, as many Western analysts suggest? Not necessarily.

The worry remains among many Chinese, and not just those in positions of power, that fully democratic elections could bring China back to its chaotic days of civil war and weakness vis-à-vis outside powers. Electoral democracy at the top might also wreck the advantages of the current political model, which still rewards political experience and long-term planning.

Can the Chinese government bolster the meritocratic elements in the country’s political system while selectively adopting democratic ideas and practices? Current trends are far from promising. Over the past couple of years, the government has ratcheted up censorship and clamped down on civil society, mostly in the name of fighting corruption and vested interests but also in an explicit campaign to resist “Western values.”

Further repression will only delay the inevitable, however. For the long term, the choice is clear: If China can open up its system while maintaining its commitment to political meritocracy, its own distinctive model of governance may get a new lease on life—and may just serve as an inspiration for the rest of the world.

—Dr. Bell is a research affiliate at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford and the director of the Berggruen Philosophy and Culture Center. His most recent book is “The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy” (Princeton University Press).