Almost half a century has elapsed since the last American GI returned back home from the jungle in Southeast Asia, and U.S. President Barack Obama has made history — marking the 20th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic ties — by welcoming to the White House the chief Vietnamese communist, party leader Nguyen Phu Trong.

The symbolic gesture of reconciliation comes amid intensified attempts by the U.S. to lure Vietnam into its sphere of influence in Asia at the expense of China and Russia.

It cannot have been easy for the U.S. administration to roll out the red carpet for Trong, since he is known to belong to the conservative wing in the Vietnamese leadership, which remains reluctant to embrace the former foe.

The revisionists among Washington’s foreign policy-makers have gained the upper hand for several reasons, with the number one consideration being the formation of a loose pro-American alliance of South East Asian nations. The second factor is the $35 billion turnover which has propelled Vietnam to the status of the United States’ largest trade partner in the region, with trade expected to reach $57 billion by 2020.

The third element is U.S. President Barack Obama’s intent to include Vietnam in the planned Trans-Pacific Partnership, a U.S.-sponsored organization that would require all member states to align themselves with American standards and business practices.

In the case of Vietnam, it would demand that Hanoi curtail the dirigisme of the government in running the economy in return for access to the U.S. domestic market for locally manufactured shoes and clothing. Trong’s visit to Washington has not produced any tangible results in this respect, but the first step has been taken.

Does this mark a dramatic new trajectory in U.S. foreign policy, or is it aimed only at achieving a breakthrough in putting together the Trans-Pacific Partnership? Is there a secret agenda? Troika Report approached Dr. Dmitry Mosyakov, deputy director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and director of the Center for South East Asia, Australia and Oceania, and here is what he had to say:

“The symbolism of the U.S. president’s welcome to Vietnam’s Communist leader cannot be underestimated given the continuous U.S. accusations of human rights violations in Vietnam and previous statements that Washington did not accept the legitimacy of communist rule in this country. This is a clear signal of the formal legitimization by the United States of communist power in Vietnam.

“The United States’ strategic goal is to influence the foreign policy alignment of Vietnam, which since the early 1990s has had a free hand in choosing friends and allies while remaining essentially neutral. It falls within the framework of the U.S. strategy of encircling China with countries with various level of alignment with Washington. We see U.S. troops are to be once again stationed in the Philippines. We see Burma as target of intensive U.S. interest. The crown prize would be Vietnam, if it is forced to abandon its balanced foreign policy orientation.”

The American media used Barack Obama’s long-term strategy to justify Washington’s rationale in welcoming Comrade Trong to the White House. The underlying concept is the same as at the core of the general focus on Asia currently being witnessed in U.S. foreign policy, and that is “to balance China’s growing economic, military and political clout.”

Is there a Russian angle to Washington’s courting of Vietnam? The question was answered by Dr. Mosyakov:

“Definitely. Russo-Vietnamese relations are unique in some sense. They are based on trust and mutual sympathy, as well as on contemporary cooperation in key areas: nuclear power generation, oil and gas production, military procurement, infrastructure projects, tourism, etc. Recently, Vietnam and Russia established a free trade zone. Now, the U.S. is attempting to diminish this partnership and present the alliance with the U.S. as the best and only option.”

Whether or not Barack Obama will succeed in his ultimate goal to bring Vietnam on board remains conditional on at least three elements.

Firstly, Vietnam’s communist leadership should resign itself to the idea of the supreme expediency of “opening up its political system,” as demanded by the United States, in exchange for a steady flow of revenues from shoe and clothing exports.

Secondly, both access to the U.S. market and the hint of a “security umbrella” to be offered by Obama’s administration in the face of Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea must overweigh the benefits of trade and economic cooperation with the world’s leader in GDP growth.

Thirdly, Obama’s plan could work if China and Russia remain transfixed on the sidelines and are unable to match Washington’s offers with anything as substantial.

In any case, the extraordinary visit by Vietnam’s ideological head to the country where not so long ago it was fashionable among some ultra-conservatives to chant “Better dead than red” marks a watershed in U.S. foreign policy. By any count, it is a coup of its own, and shows the limitless nature of Washington’s flexibility.