What Xi Jinping Offered in the U.S.: A Slight Shift in Tone

Rhetoric on U.S. trip at odds with China’s actions, but could signal more accommodation over time

Andrew Browne

SHANGHAI—On his trip to America, Xi Jinping often seemed caught between two audiences—his skeptical hosts who needed gentle reassurance and the one that mattered most, the crowd back home who admire his firm rule and tough nationalism.

It made for a few awkward moments when he tried to have things both ways.

At the U.N., for instance, he spoke out boldly for women’s rights even though his administration has detained feminists for drawing attention to sexual harassment on public transport. “Shameless,” tweeted Hillary Clinton.

On the South China Sea, Mr. Xi promised not to “militarize” disputed islands. Yet just a few days earlier, new satellite images showed Chinese contractors finishing up work on an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef long enough to land the biggest Chinese military aircraft.

He welcomed foreign NGOs, even as harsh legislation on the way will restrict their activities and put some out of business altogether; he pledged that China will remain open to foreign media organizations, skipping over the fact that censors are blocking their websites.

Given these contortions, analysts saw room for interpretation in Mr. Xi’s commitment to preventing the cybertheft of commercial secrets, the most notable deal to emerge from his summit with President Barack Obama. One big question: Will the civilians in charge of enforcement be able to rein in the powerful players in the People’s Liberation Army, whose digital fingerprints are all over cyberintrusions?

Likewise, the U.S. business community, which had been rapidly souring on China, reserved judgment on the agreement to speed up a bilateral investment treaty that would open China’s closed markets. Success will depend to a large degree on Mr. Xi’s willingness to challenge state monopolies, which he’s shown little desire to do.

Still, progress in these areas will now be held to new standards, even if it’s not guaranteed. Beyond that, Mr. Xi’s rhetoric, however ambiguous, may signal a deeper shift that will only become apparent over time.

Having ruled out the militarization of the artificial islands it has dredged in the South China Sea, China will now take a bigger hit to its regional reputation if it decides to install missiles on them, for instance, or begin air patrols, which many military analysts have been expecting.

Winning the hearts of ordinary Americans, and the trust of politicians, was always going to be a next-to-impossible endeavor for the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao. His immense popularity rests with the Chinese masses whose hearts swell with pride when he flaunts China’s new military hardware and uses it to stand up to America and its allies in Asia.

Still, Mr. Xi has plenty of incentive to reconsider his approach to relations with America that has alienated large sections of the U.S. business community, fueled criticism of China’s human-rights practices, hardened strategic thinking on China in the Pentagon and led to calls in the foreign-policy community to launch a Cold War-style containment strategy against China.

First, the Chinese leadership expects the next U.S. president, whether a Democrat or a Republican, to be tougher to deal with than Mr. Obama, whom they’ve pegged as weak and vacillating.

While there’s no prospect at all that Mr. Xi will countenance U.S. lecturing on human rights, or retreat from his nationalist goals to restore China’s ancient role as the regional hegemon, it’s not impossible that he will dial back the belligerence.

Indeed, some believe that China has been pushing its territorial claims as hard as it can in anticipation of more resistance after the U.S. presidential elections next year.

Second, the Chinese economy is heading into trouble. Mr. Xi talks up China’s ability to hit its 7% growth target this year, but many experts think he’s bluffing. Andrew Tilton, the chief Asia-Pacific economist for Goldman Sachs, believes growth has already fallen below 6% and predicts a “bumpy deceleration that will last a number of years.”

Next year will be particularly rough. Privately, top Chinese officials are talking about closures of loss-making state enterprises and major job losses. Rising unemployment not only threatens consumption, the one bright area of the economy, but could deliver a jolt to the social compact between the country’s rulers and ruled.

Investor confidence in China is fragile, and Mr. Xi knows that unstable relations between the world’s two largest economies will only exacerbate the unease. The panicked reaction in global financial centers to recent turmoil in Chinese stock and currency markets showed that a shuddering slowdown in what had appeared to be an unstoppable Chinese juggernaut is now perceived as the No. 1 risk to the international economy.

Few believe that this turnaround in China’s fortunes will induce anything like a new humility in Mr. Xi, translating into a more cooperative approach to America.

From the vantage point of Beijing, the summit was intended not so much as a reset of relations but as a necessary, and very modest, recalibration. It’s a long way from the partnership that Mr. Obama envisaged at the start of his presidency. But given Mr. Xi’s domestic power plays, it’s the best deal on offer—and the U.S. president has grasped it